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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar imposed a heightened
standard of proof for causation in Title VII retaliation claims,1 and
there is a possibility that courts could import this standard into the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2 Although Nassar, on its
face, is limited to Title VII, because the ADA and Title VII have
similar statutory language and goals, and because of the expansive
reasoning employed by the Nassar majority, it is easy to imagine
that Nassar may impact the ADA. Any effect Nassar may have on
the ADA should be prevented.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination “because of” a
protected status, that is, the employee’s race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin.3 Title VII also prohibits employer retaliation
“because of” an employee’s participation in legal proceedings against
or opposition to illegal employment practices.4 Similar “because of”
language in the ADA prohibits disability discrimination and
retaliation against people with disabilities.5
The meaning of “because of” as it relates to the principles of
causation is ambiguous. In Nassar, the Supreme Court interpreted
the “because of” language in Title VII to require the application of
a “but for” causation standard to retaliation claims even though the
“because of” language in status-based discrimination claims uses a
“motivating factor” standard.6 “But for” causation is a traditional
tort rule7 that, for a retaliation claim, requires proof that the
adverse employment action would not have occurred in the absence
of the employer’s intent to retaliate.8 The “but for” standard is
generally understood to be substantially harder to prove than the
1. 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (establishing a “but-for” causation standard).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
3. Id. § 2003-2(a).
4. Id. § 2000e-3(a). For further discussion in greater detail, see infra Part I.A.
5. Id. §§ 12112(a), 12203(a).
6. Id. § 2000e-3(a); see Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534.
7. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525.
8. Id. at 2528.
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“motivating factor” standard,9 which requires showing only that the
employer’s improper motive was one factor, even if there were
multiple factors in an adverse employment action.10
Nassar thus established a confusing paradigm in which the same
actions by an employer will be analyzed differently if used to prove
Title VII status-based discrimination as opposed to retaliation. The
analysis may also vary if the retaliation was based on disability
versus a Title VII protected status. Consider the following, greatly
oversimplified hypothetical situation.11
Rosie has a disability. Though she occasionally shows up to work
late, she is generally a good employee at the ABC Corporation. Rosie
asks her male supervisor, Sam, to accommodate her disability. After
making this request, she overhears Sam speaking with another
male employee. Sam says, “The women in this company are so
needy. Can you believe that Rosie asked me to accommodate her
disability? This company would be much better without any women
or people with disabilities.” Later, Rosie confronts Sam and says, “I
heard what you said about women and people with disabilities in
the workforce. I’m going to report you!” Several days later, Sam
terminates Rosie’s employment, citing her tardiness as justification.
Rosie sues the ABC Corporation for discrimination because of sex
under Title VII12 and discrimination because of disability under the
ADA.13 She also claims retaliation under both Title VII and the
ADA.14 What result?
Courts would apply a “motivating factor” standard of causation to
determine whether Sam’s actions were “because of” Rosie’s sex.15
Most courts would apply the same “motivating factor” standard to
Rosie’s disability discrimination claim as well.16 In light of this
standard, Rosie probably has a colorable claim for both her Title VII
9. See, e.g., id. at 2526 (“[The motivating factor standard], of course, is a lessened
causation standard.”).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
11. Although evidence of discrimination is rarely this clear, Rosie’s situation is intended
to illustrate that, even with clear facts, Nassar greatly complicates employment
discrimination litigation.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
13. Id. § 12112(a).
14. Id. § 2000e-3(a); § 12203(a).
15. Id. § 2000e-2(m); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (1989).
16. See infra note 187.
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and ADA discrimination claims. Based on Sam’s comments, she
could reasonably argue that her sex and her disability were
“motivating factors” in Sam’s decision to discharge her.
In contrast, the results are less predictable for Rosie’s retaliation
claims. Under Nassar’s new “but for” standard, Rosie may have
difficulty proving that her termination would not have occurred in
the absence of Sam’s intent to retaliate. Furthermore, whether
Rosie’s ADA retaliation claim will receive the same judicial
treatment as her Title VII retaliation claim turns on whether courts
decide to import the “but for” standard that Nassar adopted into the
ADA context. This Note considers that potential difference, arguing
that the causation standard for proving retaliation under both Title
VII and the ADA should be the same as that for proving status-
based discrimination—namely, the “motivating factor” standard, not
the “but for” standard the Nassar Court adopted.17
In addition to showing that the Supreme Court strayed from
previous understandings of the precedent when it held in Nassar
that Title VII retaliation plaintiffs are required to prove “but for”
causation, this Note argues that the “but for” test should not be
applied to retaliation claims in the context of other civil rights laws,
with a particular focus on the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Building on previous scholarship, this Note argues against the
general application of a “but for” causation standard to discrim-
ination claims of all kinds.18 This Note carves out its own niche by
suggesting several practical solutions to limit the potential negative
effects of the Nassar holding. This Note is also the first to show how
importing Nassar’s “but for” causation standard into ADA retalia-
tion claims would thwart the goals of the ADA. This is an important
area of focus because the similarities between the ADA and Title VII
might lead an impatient court or an unsophisticated advocate to
17. 133 S. Ct. 2512, 2528 (2013).
18. See, e.g., S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why
Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 608-09 (2001) (pointing to
differences between the ADA and Title VII); John D. Rue, Returning to the Roots of the
Bramble Bush: The “But For” Test Regains Primacy in Causal Analysis in the American Law
Institute’s Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2705 (2003)
(analyzing and critiquing the “but for” test). But see David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The
Gross Beast of Burden of Proof: Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences
Employment Discrimination Case Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 908 (2010) (pointing out
similarities between the ADA and Title VII).
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improperly conflate the two and import Nassar’s reasoning into an
ADA claim, thereby unduly burdening an ADA plaintiff’s civil
rights. This Note contributes to the scholarship that recognizes the
important differences between the ADA and Title VII,19 and argues
against a wholesale importation of Title VII doctrine into the ADA.
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I will briefly discuss
Title VII and the Nassar case. Part II will advance textual and
public policy explanations for why the impact of the Nassar decision
on future ADA cases should be mitigated, primarily arguing that it
would be unjust and against public policy to entrench Nassar’s
flawed analysis by importing it into the ADA. Part III of this Note
will propose two plausible and practical methods of mitigating the
impact of the Nassar case on future ADA and Title VII cases: (1)
abrogating the Nassar decision through legislative action or (2)
judicially distinguishing Nassar from the ADA context, cabining its
analysis to Title VII. Part IV will address potential counter-
arguments. By adopting this Note’s proposals, courts and Congress
would promote the principles of clarity, consistency, and justice in
Title VII and the ADA.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII Background
Title VII is one of eleven titles of the landmark Civil Rights Act
of 1964.20 Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.21 Generally, an
employer is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees” for a significant
portion of the year.22 In addition to prohibiting status-based
discrimination, Title VII also prohibits retaliation, which it defines
as discrimination against an employee because the employee
19. See, e.g., Malloy, supra note 18, at 608-09.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
21. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
22. Id. § 2000e(b). Notably, this definition excludes: Indian Tribes; some departments and
agencies of the District of Columbia (per 5 U.S.C. § 2102); and private membership clubs,
except labor organizations. Id. Although Title VII originally exempted federal employers, this
exemption has since been abolished. Id. § 2000e-16.
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opposed an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII or
made a charge of unlawful employment practices.23 The “because
of” language has proven to be both important and contentious in the
litigation history of Title VII.24 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the
Court decided that “because of” should be interpreted broadly to
establish a “motivating factor” causation standard.25
In the Price Waterhouse decision, six Justices agreed that a
plaintiff proves his or her claim of status-based discrimination if he
or she can prove that discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the
adverse employment decision that harmed the plaintiff, even if
other factors also played a part.26 However, the Price Waterhouse
plurality also described an affirmative defense for employers. Once
a plaintiff met the “motivating factor” standard, the burden of
persuasion would shift to the employer to show that it would have
acted the same way, regardless of its improper motive.27 Under the
Price Waterhouse decision, if an employer could prove this “same
decision” defense, it was wholly absolved of liability.28 Neither
plaintiffs nor defendants were entirely satisfied by the Price
Waterhouse decision. Although the “motivating factor” standard was
a positive result for plaintiffs, the “same decision” defense was
helpful for employers.
In response to Price Waterhouse, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (“1991 Amendments”), which, in part, abrogated
the portion of Price Waterhouse that allowed the employer an
absolute affirmative defense once a plaintiff had proved the
existence of an impermissible “motivating factor.”29 Congress
replaced the absolute defense from Price Waterhouse with a quasi-
affirmative defense, limiting remedies but maintaining liability.30
After the 1991 Amendments, if an employer can prove that it would
have taken the same actions regardless of motive, remedies are
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
24. E.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
25. 490 U.S. at 241-42.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 258.
28. Id.
29. Gross, 557 U.S. at 178 n.5.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2) (2012).
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limited to declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as limited
attorney’s fees and costs.31
The 1991 Amendments also confirmed the validity of Price
Waterhouse’s “motivating factor” causation standard by inserting
the following language into Title VII: “[A]n unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.”32 Congress inserted this text into the
statutory section containing the status-based antidiscrimination
provision, namely § 2000e-2.33 Congress’s decisions about where
exactly to place this language within the text of Title VII would
become very important when the question of Title VII causation
standards for retaliation came before the Supreme Court in
Nassar.34
B. Factual History of Nassar
In 1995, Dr. Naiel Nassar, an internal medicine and infectious
diseases specialist of Middle Eastern descent, was hired as both a
faculty member at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center (“University”) and a staff physician at the Parkland
Memorial Hospital (“Hospital”).35 The affiliation agreement between
the University and the Hospital required the Hospital to offer empty
staff physician posts to University faculty members.36 In 2004, Dr.
Beth Levine was hired as the University’s Chief of Infectious
Diseases Medicine, which made her Dr. Nassar’s ultimate, though
not direct, supervisor.37 Dr. Gregory Fitz, University Chair of
Internal Medicine, was Dr. Levine’s immediate supervisor.38 Dr.
31. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
32. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
33. Id.
34. See discussion infra Part I.D.
35. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Nassar’s allegations of discrimination and retaliation arose from Dr.
Levine’s and Dr. Fitz’s actions.39
Dr. Nassar’s complaint alleged that Dr. Levine held a bias against
Dr. Nassar that manifested, among other ways, by undeserved
scrutiny of his billing practices and productivity, as well as by Dr.
Levine’s statement, “Middle Easterners are lazy.”40 Due to this
perceived bias, Dr. Nassar made arrangements with the Hospital to
continue working at the Hospital without being on the University
faculty, which would remove him from Dr. Levine’s supervision.41 In
July 2006, Dr. Nassar resigned his faculty post.42 Dr. Nassar sent a
letter to Dr. Fitz explaining his reasons for departing from the
University faculty, namely Dr. Levine’s harassment.43 In response,
Dr. Fitz protested Dr. Nassar’s employment offer from the Hospital,
citing the affiliation agreement between the Hospital and the
University.44 After Dr. Fitz’s protestations, the Hospital withdrew
its offer to Dr. Nassar.45 Nassar sued, claiming that the University
discriminated against him on the basis of race and religion leading
to constructive discharge.46 Dr. Nassar also claimed that the
University retaliated against him for complaining about Dr.
Levine’s national origin harassment.47
C. Procedural History
At trial, the jury found for Dr. Nassar on both his status-based
discrimination claim and his retaliation claim.48 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit found insufficient evidence to support Dr. Nassar’s
constructive discharge claim, but affirmed the verdict on Dr.
Nassar’s retaliation claim under the theory that retaliation claims
require proof merely that a retaliatory motive was a “motivating
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2523-24.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2524.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. 
47. Id.
48. Id.
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factor” in the adverse employment decision, not the “but for” cause.49
Thus, even if non-retaliatory factors—such as incorrect billing
practices or low productivity—contributed to the University’s
decision to interfere with Nassar’s offer from the Hospital, Dr.
Nassar proved his case by showing that the retaliatory motive was
a contributing factor.
D. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding in a hotly
contested 5-4 decision:
Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to tradi-
tional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation
test [“motivating factor” standard] stated in § 2000e-2(m) [of
Title VII]. This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation
would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful
action or actions of the employer.50
To support its holding, the Court articulated a primary textual
argument in three parts and two non-text-based arguments.
1. Primary Textual Argument
After framing the issue by invoking the basic principles of tort
law that guided its decision, the Court embarked on a narrow
textual analysis of Title VII’s § 2000e-2 (prohibiting status-based
discrimination) and § 2000e-3 (prohibiting retaliation).51 The Court’s
textual analysis argued three main points.
First, after conceding that Title VII defines retaliation as an “un-
lawful employment practice,” the majority held that the application
of the “motivating factor” standard to unlawful employment
practices does not include retaliation.52 The majority reached this
conclusion by pointing out that the text immediately surrounding
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2533.
51. Id. at 2524-25. Commentators have questioned the premise that tort principles apply
to employment discrimination analyses. See infra Part II.A.1.
52. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.
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the “motivating factor” provision specifically addressed only the five
protected statuses—race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin—but does not specifically address retaliation.53
The Court further supported the argument that the unlawful
employment practice of retaliation is separate from the unlawful
employment practice of status-based discrimination by citing to
Gross v. FBL Financial Services.54 The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII both prohibit discrimination
“because of” the respective statutes’ protected trait or traits.55 In
contrast to Price Waterhouse, the Gross Court interpreted the
“because of” language in the ADEA to apply a “but for” causation
standard.56 The Gross Court found it significant that Title VII was
amended to apply the “motivating factor” standard.57 Unlike Title
VII, the ADEA does not have an express “motivating factor”
provision.58 Based on this textual difference, the Gross Court refused
to apply Title VII’s “motivating factor” standard to the ADEA.59 The
majority in Nassar found a parallel between the ADEA and Title
VII’s anti-retaliation section, which lacks an express causation
standard, in order to apply Gross’s “but for” standard to Title VII
retaliation claims.60
Second, the majority argued that Congress intended to hold
retaliation to a different standard than status-based discrimination
by placing the 1991 Amendments’ “motivating factor” provision in
a section that does not expressly mention retaliation.61 Looking at
the structure of Title VII, the majority found determinative the fact
that the “motivating factor” provision could have been, but was not,
placed in the anti-retaliation provision when Congress enacted the
1991 Amendments.62
Third, the majority found that the relevant precedent was
inconclusive because previous cases looked at statutes without
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2526-29 (discussing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
56. 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
57. Id. at 174.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 174-75.
60. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2527 (2013).
61. Id. at 2529.
62. See id.
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express anti-retaliation provisions.63 The majority argued that
interpretations of broadly worded antidiscrimination statutes to
include retaliation are not determinative when a statute expressly
prohibits retaliation.64 The majority thereby justified applying a
different causation standard to retaliation by distinguishing Title
VII from the precedential cases on specificity.65
2. Secondary Policy Arguments
In the last part of its analysis, the majority strayed from argu-
ments grounded in the text of Title VII and its underlying policies.
First, the majority invoked the heavy caseloads of courts across the
country, arguing that holding retaliation to the lessened “motivating
factor” standard would open the floodgates of litigation and clog the
courts with frivolous retaliation claims.66
Second, the Court dismissed the argument that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) guidance ratio-
nales for applying a “motivating factor” causation standard should
be given deference.67 The Court principally argued that the EEOC
failed to address the particular interplay of the status-based
discrimination and anti-retaliation sections. For this reason the
Court concluded that the EEOC guidance lacked the persuasive
force required to receive deference.68 With these arguments as
justification, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and applied a
heightened “but for” standard of causation to Title VII retaliation
claims.
63. See id. at 2529-31.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 2531.
67. Id. at 2533.
68. Id. at 2533; see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such
a[n agency] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.”).
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II. THE IMPACT OF NASSAR SHOULD BE MITIGATED
The text, structure, and intent of Title VII counsel against the
application of the “but for” standard to retaliation claims. Important
public policy considerations, highlighted by the hypothetical with
Rosie, similarily counsel against the “but for” standard. This Part
will argue that the Supreme Court’s application of the “but for”
analysis standard to Title VII retaliation claims in Nassar should be
legislatively overruled or, at the very least, limited to the Title VII
retaliation context to avoid negative effects extending to other civil
rights laws, particularly the Americans with Disabilities Act.
A. The Court’s Reasoning in Nassar Strays from Previous                
    Understandings of the Precedent
There are three significant flaws in the Nassar Court’s reasoning:
(1) employment discrimination is not a basic tort as the Court
implied in Nassar;69 (2) the Court’s treatment of Gross is unconvinc-
ing;70 and (3) the Court abandons the well established common
understanding that retaliation is just one type of discrimination,71
which renders the Court’s reliance on the structural separation of
the status-based antidiscrimination section and the anti-retaliation
section of Title VII misplaced.
1. The Court’s Assumption that Discrimination Is a Tort Is         
Unfounded
In Nassar, the Court assumed that analysis of Title VII claims
should fundamentally follow the analysis in basic tort claims, which
usually requires showing that the harm was but-for the defendant’s
actions.72 This, the Court argued, justified the use of the “but for”
69. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524-25.
70. Id. at 2526-27.
71. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173-74 (“Retaliation is,
by definition, an intentional act. It is a form of ‘discrimination’ because the complainant is
being subjected to differential treatment.”); Discrimination by Type, U.S. EEOC, http://www.
eeoc.gov/laws/types/index.cfm [http://perma.cc/KB5E-SCG2] (listing retaliation as a type of
discrimination).
72. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525 (citations omitted).
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standard in Title VII retaliation claims, given that tort was “the
background against which Congress legislated in enacting Title VII,
and [tort rules] are the default rules it is presumed to have incorpo-
rated, absent an indication to the contrary in the statute itself.”73
The Court’s assumption ignored the fact that employment dis-
crimination claims are not basic tort cases,74 which is why special-
ized legislation has been passed to give substance to such claims.75
Indeed, as Professor Charles Sullivan notes, “[d]iscrimination maps
onto no obvious tort.... Statutes are, almost by definition, passed to
meet shortcomings in the common law.”76 Therefore, the Court’s
foundational assumption that Title VII analysis cleanly corresponds
with traditional tort doctrine is likely false77 and immediately sets
the Court’s entire analysis on shaky ground.
The Court fails to satisfactorily explain why the “but for”
standard should still be considered “the default rule[ ] [Congress] is
presumed to have incorporated” because there does exist an
“indication to the contrary in the statute itself.”78 Even if Congress
did originally envision the “but for” test as the causation standard
for Title VII, this original assumption was abrogated by the 1991
73. Id.
74. Sandra Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) (“Employment discrimination claims do not fit within any
traditional tort and therefore do not align well with traditional articulations of proximate
cause.”).
75. This is not to say that tort and civil rights are mutually exclusive, but antidiscrim-
ination claims are fundamentally Commerce Clause constitutional claims, not tort claims.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce.”); see also Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migra-
tion from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2142 (2007) (stating that the
“primary focus” of Title VII is “economic loss caused by a change in employment status”).
76. Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431,
1432 nn.1-2 (2012).
77. See Sandra Sperino, The Tort Label (working paper), available at http://perma.cc/
4S5E-QV4J, at 2 (“The Court counterintuitively assumes that even though the discrimination
statutes change the common law, at-will employment relationship, Congress meant to retain
common law meanings for statutory words. This argument is facially problematic. It is made
even more so by the fact that the Supreme Court did not interpret the ADEA or Title VII
through a common law lens during the first three decades after their enactment.”).
78. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013) (“[Tort rules] are
the default rules it is presumed to have incorporated, absent an indication to the contrary in
the statute itself.”). The statute expressly includes the words “an unlawful practice is
established when ... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (emphasis added).
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Amendments, when Congress added the “motivating factor”
provision.79 Furthermore, the fact that Congress passed the 1991
Amendments so soon after introducing the “motivating factor”
standard in Price Waterhouse undermines the Court’s argument
that “but for” causation is the “default rule[ ] [Congress] is presumed
to have incorporated.”80 If Congress assumed the “but for” standard
applied, it would not have so quickly affirmed Price Waterhouse’s
“motivating factor” standard.
The Court’s conclusion that Title VII retaliation claims should be
subject to the traditional tort “but for” causation standard is unper-
suasive. Following this unconvincing employment-discrimination-is-
a-tort argument, the Court next looked to the controversial Gross
case for support.81
2. The Court’s Reliance on Gross Is Unsound
Gross examined the same question presented in Price Waterhouse,
but in the ADEA context: what does “because of” mean?82 As
explained above,83 in Gross, the Court declined to adopt the
“motivating factor” interpretation endorsed by the Price Waterhouse
plurality and instead adopted the “but for” causation test from
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Price Waterhouse.84 The Gross Court
explained, “[t]extual differences between Title VII and the ADEA ...
prevent[ed] ... appl[ication] [of] Price Waterhouse ... to federal age
discrimination claims [in Gross].”85 The principal textual difference
is the lack of the “motivating factor” language in the ADEA, which
was added to Title VII in 1991.86
However, the foundation of the Court’s holding in Nassar appears
to rely on the exact opposite conclusion:
79. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)). Of course, this is the principal question in Nassar: Does the
“motivating factor” standard in § 2000e-2(m) also apply to § 2000e-3, or not? Nassar, 133 S.
Ct. at 2525. As shown below, the answer to this should be yes, the “motivating factor”
standard should apply to retaliation claims as well.
80. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525.
81. See id. at 2526-28.
82. Id. at 2527 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 172 (2009)).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 56-63.
84. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 & n.2 (2009).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 174.
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Given the lack of any meaningful textual difference between the
text in this statute [Title VII’s retaliation provision] and the one
in Gross [the ADEA], the proper conclusion ... is that Title VII
retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was
the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.87
In other words, the Court holds that because the retaliation section
of Title VII contains the same “because of” language as the ADEA
section at issue in Gross, unmodified by an express “motivating
factor” provision, the Gross reasoning applies.
It is disingenuous to apply Gross’s restrictive reading of the
ADEA back to a Title VII provision after Gross emphatically
rejected the argument that Title VII interpretations apply to the
ADEA.88 Nearly identical “because of” language exists in both §
2000e-2 and § 2000e-3. Section 2000e-2(a) states: “It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to ... discriminate
against any individual ... because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”89 Section 2000e-3(a) states: “It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees ... because [the employee] has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
[title].”90
However diligently the Court attempts to distance itself from
Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of “because of” in the Title VII
context by relying on Gross, Price Waterhouse is valid and applicable
to the issue in Nassar. Price Waterhouse concluded that “[t]o
construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for
causation,’ as does [Petitioner], is to misunderstand them.”91
Therefore, the Nassar Court’s finding of significance in the statutory
location of the “motivating factor” standard92 “misunderstand[s]”
87. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.
88. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 173-75.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
91. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989). In an accompanying footnote,
the Court explained the misunderstanding by distinguishing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), on the basis that a citation to the “but for” standard
in McDonald merely held that proving “but for” causation was sufficient, not necessary. Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 n.6.
92. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527 (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 178 n.5).
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Congress’s intent in codifying that language.93 Supposing the
absence of the 1991 Amendments’ codification of the “motivating
factor” language, the Court would presumably apply the same
analysis interpreting § 2000e-2 to § 2000e-3 given the lack of any
meaningful textual difference between the two sections.94 It is
therefore reasonable to conclude that the “motivating factor”
standard in § 2000e-2 applies equally to § 2000e-3 because the
fundamental analysis behind the interpretation of § 2000e-2 from
Price Waterhouse contains language nearly identical to that in
§ 2000e-3.
When Congress affirmed the “motivating factor” standard in the
1991 Amendments, the proper construction of Title VII was not
altered. Congress did nothing more than confirm that aspect of the
Court’s interpretation of the statute in Price Waterhouse. If
Congress had intended to contradict the Price Waterhouse reasoning
and apply different causation standards to retaliation and status-
based discrimination, it would have done so explicitly. When,
however, Congress chooses to preserve language that has been
interpreted in case law, that choice implies an acceptance of those
previous interpretations and imports them into the new legisla-
tion—here, the amended Title VII.95 Therefore, it is more logical to
assume that, when drafting and enacting the 1991 Amendments,
Congress did not see the need to expressly confirm that courts
should interpret “because of” consistently within Title VII.
Instead of justifying the application of Gross, as the Nassar Court
argued,96 Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Amendments invali-
dated Gross’s analysis to the circumstances in Nassar. The 1991
Amendments recognized and explicitly accepted Price Waterhouse’s
interpretation of Title VII’s “because of” language.97 It is of no great
93. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
94. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000) (quoting
Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“The meaning ... of certain words
or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.... It is a ‘fundamental canon of
statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”).
95. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (“[A] legislative body
generally uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context.”).
96. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527.
97. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)) (adopting the same burden of proof standard—a “motivating
factor”—from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
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import that this was codified only in the same section of the statute
that Price Waterhouse originally analyzed.98 Gross should be
distinguished because the Gross Court was comparing two different
statutes, not two different sections of the same statute.
With the foundational bases of the Court’s reasoning now
undercut, all that remains is the majority’s textual argument, which
fails upon an examination of the relevant precedent.
3. The Court’s Textual Argument Is Incorrect
The Nassar Court’s textual argument was that the “motivating
factor” language does not apply to the retaliation prohibition
because retaliation is distinct from status-based discrimination.99
With this strict interpretation, the Nassar decision strays from the
time-honored understanding that courts must give liberal construc-
tion to civil rights statutes meant to provide broad and sweeping
protections against discrimination.100 Even when a retaliation
prohibition is unarticulated in a statute, the Court has consistently
construed antidiscrimination laws to afford higher protection
against retaliation than it does in Nassar.101
In Title VII, however, Congress was presumably particularly
concerned about retaliation because it went through the trouble of
specifically articulating the prohibition in the statute.102 As Justice
Ginsburg stated in dissent, “[i]t is strange logic,” to interpret Title
VII’s specific prohibition of retaliation in § 2000e-3(a) as weaker
than unarticulated prohibitions of retaliation in more general civil
rights laws that have been read in by the Court.103
The case of Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., provides one
such example of the Court reading a protection against retaliation
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
99. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528-29.
100. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT POLICY
BRIEF SERIES, NO. 4,  BROAD OR NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF THE ADA, 2-3 (2002), available at
http://perma.cc/A45E-Q6EQ (“A clear tradition of American law is that civil rights laws and
other remedial statutes are to be construed liberally to achieve their remedial purposes....
Strict interpretation is the exact opposite of the customary application of liberal or broad
interpretation to civil rights laws.”).
101. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (listing cases).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
103. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2541 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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into a broadly worded antidiscrimination statute.104 In Sullivan, the
Court found a protection against retaliation in 42 U.S.C. § 1982,105
which simply states that “[a]ll citizens ... shall have the same right
... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to ... property.”106 The Court
reasoned that “[a] narrow construction of the language of § 1982
would be quite inconsistent with the broad and sweeping nature of
the protection meant to be afforded by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, ... from which § 1982 was derived.”107
The Court similarly held in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education, a Title IX case, “Retaliation is, by definition, an inten-
tional act. It is a form of ‘discrimination’ because the complainant
is being subjected to differential treatment.”108 As a result, “it is not
only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress
expected its enactment [of Title IX] to be interpreted in conformity
with [Sullivan].”109 Thus, based on Sullivan, the Court decided that
a narrow construction of Title IX would be inconsistent with the
intent of that statute, and a proscription of retaliation was read into
Title IX.110
The Court further confirmed that retaliation is simply a form of
discrimination by reading into the ADEA a prohibition on retalia-
tion in Gomez-Perez v. Potter.111 In Gomez-Perez, the Court ex-
plained, “What Jackson said about the relationship between
Sullivan and the enactment of Title IX can be said as well about the
relationship between Sullivan and the enactment of the ADEA.”112
Finally, in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, the Court held that
retaliation for race discrimination constitutes discrimination based
on race under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.113 In its reasoning for expanding the
principle to § 1981 that it had been developing through Sullivan,
Jackson, and Gomez-Perez, the Court explained that “[w]hile the
104. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
105. Id. at 237.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
107. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237 (citation omitted).
108. 544 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2005).
109. Id. at 176 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979)).
110. See id.
111. 553 U.S. 474 (2008).
112. Id. at 485.
113. 553 U.S. 442 (2008).
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Sullivan decision interpreted § 1982, our precedents have long
construed §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly.”114
Assuming the Court was earnest in its conclusions in Sullivan,
Jackson, Gomez-Perez, and CBOCS, retaliation would be proscribed
by § 2000e-2's prohibition of discrimination in “any employment
practice,”115 even if § 2000e-3 did not exist. Thus, the structural
separation of the express prohibition on retaliation and the
“motivating factor” language is not determinative,116 especially
considering the intent of the 1991 Amendments that added the
“motivating factor” standard to strengthen Title VII’s protections
against discrimination.117
The Nassar Court’s attempt to distinguish the Sullivan-Jackson-
Gomez-Perez-CBOCS line of cases was unpersuasive. The Court
wrote: “[T]he laws at issue in ... Jackson, and Gómez-Pérez were
broad, general bars on discrimination.... [W]hen Congress’ treat-
ment of the subject of prohibited discrimination was both broad and
brief, its omission of any specific discussion of retaliation was
unremarkable.”118 Nassar gave no convincing reasons to explain why
an express prohibition of retaliation is remarkable or to justify why
such an express prohibition should provide less protection against
retaliation than an implied prohibition.119
114. Id. at 447.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
116. Statutory structure and language is important to consider, but it is rarely dispositive.
When a bill is drafted, it must go through several committees, which will often alter language
to broker political compromises. See Schoolhouse Rock!: I’m Just a Bill (ABC television
broadcast Mar. 27, 1976). Also, lobbying groups, who want specific wordings or interpretations
beneficial to their immediate interests, heavily influence the text of statutes. See Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 423
(1988). Thus, it is unwise to place anything more than an easily rebutted presumption that
a statute’s text is sine qua non of the legislature’s intent.
117. The 1991 Amendments were intended to provide additional protections against
discrimination and respond to a number of Court decisions that cut back on the scope and
effectiveness of Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (“[T]o amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
strengthen and improve Federal civil rights laws.”); see also John M. Husband & Jude Biggs,
The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Expanding Remedies in Employment Discrimination Cases, 21
COLO. LAW. 881, 881 (1992) (“The motivation for the 1991 legislation was to reverse five U.S.
Supreme Court decisions handed down in 1989 ... [and] two decisions from the 1991 Supreme
Court term.”).
118. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2530 (2013).
119. See id. at 2541 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It is strange logic indeed to conclude that
when Congress homed in on retaliation and codified the proscription, as it did in Title VII,
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Title VII’s express retaliation provision is not evidence that
Congress intended to treat retaliation on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin differently than retaliation under a
broadly worded anti-discrimination statute.120 Such a conclusion
would be illogical, considering the purpose of anti-discrimination
civil rights laws—to eradicate discrimination prophylactically.121 To
the contrary, if any inference is to be drawn from Congress’s distinct
prohibition of retaliation in Title VII, it should be that Congress was
expressing its conclusion that retaliation because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in the workplace is especially
offensive. Since the Court applied the same standard to both status-
based discrimination and retaliation in other statutes, the same
should apply to Title VII.
B. Public Policy Arguments
When policy considerations are realistically analyzed, it becomes
more evident that Nassar may have unintended negative effects.
First, like Rosie from the hypothetical in this Note’s Introduction,
plaintiffs who allege both Title VII status-based discrimination and
Title VII retaliation, or a mixture of Title VII and ADA claims, will
feel the impact of Nassar most acutely. The Nassar “but for”
standard will limit employers’ exposure to liability at the expense
of plaintiffs like Rosie. Second, the Court’s “floodgates of litigation”
argument was unpersuasive.122 Third, the Court’s argument that the
application of a “motivating factor” standard would legitimize
frivolous claims of retaliation was similarly unpersuasive.123
Congress meant protection against that unlawful employment practice to have less force than
the protection available when the statute does not mention retaliation.”).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
287 (1976) (rejecting a “mechanical reading” of § 1981's statutory language).
121. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (recognizing
that anti-retaliation provisions are essential to securing “a workplace where individuals are
not discriminated against”).
122. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531.
123. See id. at 2532.
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1. “But for” Causation Will Allow Retaliation in Many
Circumstances
The Nassar decision places plaintiffs like Rosie from the introduc-
tory hypothetical in a confusing situation. The same actions on the
part of Sam led to both of Rosie’s claims. As Part I.A above explains,
Rosie must prove that her sex and disability statuses were “motivat-
ing factors” in Sam’s decision to fire her.124 However, after Nassar,
if she is to prevail on her retaliation claim, she must prove that her
statement to Sam was the “but for” cause of her termination.125 This,
confusingly, establishes two standards that she must apply to the
same factual scenario.126
A real world application of “but for” causation to retaliation
claims will allow retaliation to occur unpunished in many cases,
which “undermine[s] the effectiveness ... and conflict[s] with the
language and purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions.”127 The “but
for” standard after Nassar establishes the de facto requirement that
a plaintiff prove that a retaliatory motive was the sole reason for his
or her adverse employment action. This directly contradicts Con-
gress’s clear intent in enacting the “because of” language, having
specifically considered and rejected “‘solely’ ... ‘because of’”
language.128 For example, the new “but for” test for retaliation will
effectively allow employers to discriminate with impunity against
employees whose employment is about to be terminated, or in
similar circumstances that are likely to arise.129 Assume that the
hypothetical Rosie’s poor attendance records put her at risk of
termination. Although this legitimate reason for Rosie’s dismissal
exists, Sam’s retaliatory motive that arose following Rosie’s
confrontation was clearly a “motivating factor,” but not necessarily
the “but for” cause of her termination. Notwithstanding Sam’s
124. See discussion supra Part I.A.
125. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.
126. See id. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127. Peter M. Panken, Retaliation Update: Don’t Get Mad, Don’t Get Even, Just Be Savvy,
SH014 ALI-ABA 973, 1053 (July 25-27, 2002).
128. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 n.7 (1989) (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 2728,
13,837 (1964)).
129. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (“[I]t would be destructive of
this purpose of the antiretaliation provision [to maintain access to remedies] for an employer
to be able to retaliate with impunity against an entire class of acts under Title VII.”).
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motive to retaliate, Rosie may still have been terminated. This
necessarily denies Rosie the ability to prove retaliation under the
new Nassar “but for” standard.130 In this situation, Rosie would
effectively be forced to prove that Sam’s retaliatory motive was the
one and only factor in Sam’s decision to terminate her.
The Nassar Court unconvincingly dismissed the problem
demonstrated by Rosie’s situation, which is similar to the situation
Dr. Nassar faced. The Court reasoned, “If it were proper to apply the
motivating-factor standard to respondent’s retaliation claim, the
University might well be subject to liability on account of Dr. Fitz’s
[poor motives], even if it could also be shown that the terms of the
affiliation agreement precluded ... hiring.”131 This argument at-
tempts to revive Price Waterhouse’s absolute “same decision”
defense that was clearly rejected by the 1991 Amendments.132
In part, Price Waterhouse decided that if an employer could prove
that it would have taken the same action against the employee
notwithstanding the employer’s improper discriminatory motive, it
was absolved of all liability.133 Congress clearly abrogated this
section of Price Waterhouse in the 1991 Amendments.134 In the place
of a complete elimination of liability with proof of the “same
decision” defense, Congress enacted a limited remedies structure.135
The remedies are limited to declaratory and injunctive relief, as well
as limited attorney’s fees and costs; courts may not award damages
or order admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment if
the employer proves that it would have made the same decision
notwithstanding a discriminatory motive.136
This limited remedies structure is fair and effective. It strikes a
careful and equitable balance between the right to an adequate
remedy for victims of discrimination, and the rights of employers to
avoid overcompensating plaintiffs. It may be true that if the
“motivating factor” standard were applied without the limited
130. See Rue, supra note 18, at 2681 (“An action is not a ‘but for’ cause of an injury if the
injury would have come about regardless of the action.”).
131. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532.
132. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 107(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (2012)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012)).
133. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.
134. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(b).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012).
136. Id.
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remedies structure, plaintiffs would receive a financial windfall.
However, in light of the limited remedies, implementing the “but
for” standard in retaliation claims will simply award a windfall to
defendants. Most importantly, the limited remedy structure is
statutorily required.137 The majority in Nassar failed to justify its
attempt to revive, in the retaliation context, this expressly abro-
gated holding from Price Waterhouse.
Although the Court attempted to maneuver around Title VII’s
established limited liability structure, the statute explicitly
dismisses the Court’s concern that an employer might still be
subject to liability after raising the “same decision” defense. The
mere existence of a retaliatory motive subjects the employer to
liability and allows a remedy to the affected employee.138
2. The Court Justified Its Holding with an Unconvincing and     
        Irrelevant Slippery Slope Argument
The Nassar Court invoked the goal of fewer retaliation cases on
courts’ dockets as a guiding principle behind its decision.139 The
Court argued that the application of the “motivating factor”
standard to retaliation claims would open the floodgates of litiga-
tion.140 Even setting aside the fact that this argument is generally
understood to be a red herring and unnecessary alarmism,141 the
prediction is also incorrect.142 Although raw statistics do show a
moderate increase in retaliation claims since the last time this
137. Id.
138. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (explaining the “primary
purpose of antiretaliation provisions: Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms.”); see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (“Title VII meant to condemn even
those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.”).
139. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531-32 (2013).
140. See id.
141. See Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of
Litigation”, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 378 (2003) (“[I]n almost all situations, the fear of
increased litigation is not a valid judicial argument.”). Judge Richard Posner has “considered
the effects of the caseload rise on federal judges,” and has concluded that judges that “mingl[e]
... caseload and substantive concerns ... compromise the perceived legitimacy of their role.”
Id. at 390, 395.
142. See id. at 379 (“[F]loodgates arguments ... are not accompanied by an analysis tending
to demonstrate that a certain judicial decision would, in fact, lead to a high amount of new
federal court litigation.”).
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“floodgates” argument was made,143 retaliation claims were already
on a steady rise.144 This rise in claims is easily attributable to a
moderate increase in employees asserting their rights; it is not
evidence of a great number of people suddenly trying to game the
system.145 In other words, instead of asking why are there so many
discrimination claims, the question should be why so few.146
Empirical data suggest antidiscrimination legislation is woefully
underutilized.147 This rise in the number of employees asserting
their rights is undoubtedly a positive step towards a just society;
law and policy should encourage the robust enforcement of civil
rights, not the reduction of civil rights protections that the Nassar
decision effects.
Furthermore, the Court’s fundamental alteration of the retalia-
tion standard itself will likely have the result of an uptick in
retaliation claims, as people across the country will be forced to
litigate to redefine the boundaries of this new doctrine.148 As Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent emphatically pointed out, this was stable ground
before.149 Now, after Nassar, plaintiffs will need to learn exactly
which facts will satisfy “but for” causation and, most applicably to
this Note, litigation will be necessary to define Nassar’s impact on
other statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act.
143. Scholars and the public responded with the same “floodgates” argument when
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), was decided.
144. See, e.g., Kelsey C. Crew, Clearing the Air or Muddying the Waters? The Effect of
Burlington Northern on Title VII Retaliation Litigation, 58 LAB. L.J. 96, 108 (2007).
145. Laura Beth Nielson & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 665
(2005) (“[T]he dramatic rise of employment discrimination claiming that occurred in the 1990s
can be attributed to a relatively small increase in the rate of claiming by aggrieved
individuals.”).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2537-38 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 2537 (“[T]his Court has held, in a line of decisions unbroken until today, that
a ban on discrimination encompasses retaliation.”).
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3. The Realities of Civil Rights Litigation Demonstrate that a      
        “Motivating Factor” Standard Would not Legitimize                 
       Frivolous Claims
The Court ignored the unfortunate reality of civil rights litigation
when it implied that loosening the causation standard for retalia-
tion would legitimize frivolous claims and result in windfalls for
plaintiffs.150 In fact, it is extraordinarily rare for victims of retalia-
tion to receive a remedy.151 Even for straightforward retaliation
claims, the procedural barriers often frustrate potential plaintiffs or
set their claims up for failure.152 For example, internal remedies
must be exhausted before filing a claim with the EEOC, otherwise
the employee risks allowing the employer an affirmative defense to
liability for damages.153 If the employer’s internal processes do not
“operate to deflect employees from pursuing their claims,” employ-
ees must then file a formal complaint with the EEOC before
pursuing litigation in a court.154 Employees may pursue litigation
themselves only after the EEOC has completed an investigation,
determined that there is or is not reasonable cause, attempted
informal resolution, and decided whether to bring a civil suit of its
own. If the EEOC chooses not to bring suit itself, but determines the
claim is valid, it must issue a “right to sue letter” to the aggrieved
person.155 This complex process will likely dissuade most, if not all,
charging parties with truly frivolous claims from continuing with
their suit. The Nassar Court ignored the fact that, even if an
employee manages to successfully navigate the EEOC process, he or
she faces the overwhelming statistical likelihood that he or she will
lose in court.156
150. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532.
151. See Nielson & Nelson, supra note 145, at 668 (discussing how victims of discrimination
“are often reluctant to complain,” and that “[t]hose who do complain seldom succeed”).
152. See, e.g., id. at 685-86 (“Employees who do not take advantage of their employer’s
complaint process when they think they have been subjected to discrimination allow an
affirmative defense for the employer.... [Internal complaint] offices may be more a symbolic
signal that the corporation is complying with the law than an internal structure that actually
produces good results for complaining employees.”).
153. See id. at 685-86; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
154. See Nielson & Nelson, supra note 145, at 686.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (2012).
156. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Retaliation-Based Charges FY 1997-
FY 2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/retaliation.cfm [http://perma.
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The Court also ignored that the same windfall-for-plaintiffs
argument it made has been firmly rejected, albeit in the Americans
with Disabilities Act context.157 Professor Ruth Colker, in her
extensive study of ADA case outcomes, found that, instead of being
a windfall for plaintiffs, ADA plaintiffs overwhelmingly lose their
suits.158 Though the comparison between ADA cases and Title VII
data is not perfect,159 they are comparable enough to significantly
undermine this aspect of the Court’s reasoning.160 It is unlikely that
using the “motivating factor” causation standard would so drasti-
cally flip the data from a windfall for defendants to a windfall for
plaintiffs.
Thus, far from being a legitimizing and windfall-creating
standard, a “motivating factor” standard will only modestly increase
allegations and plaintiff victories. This represents only a marginal
increase of people asserting their rights. It is highly likely that
countless examples of retaliation will still go unreported and
unremedied.161 With this in mind, this Note now turns to a forward-
looking discussion on what can be done to mitigate Nassar’s
potential negative impact and to help more aggrieved employees
find justice, at least in the ADA context.
cc/NN73-ZQBY] (last visited Sept. 12, 2014) [hereinafter EEOC 1997-2013]; Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, Retaliation-Based Charges FY 1992-FY 1996, EEOC, http:
//www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/retaliation-a.cfm [http://perma.cc/GH67-CZDN]
(last visited Sept. 12, 2014) [hereinafter EEOC 1992-1996].
157. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531 (2013) (“In addition
lessening the causation standard could also contribute to the filing of frivolous claims.”); Ruth
Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 99, 99 (1999) (“A senior editor at Reader’s Digest asserted that plaintiffs ‘have used
the ADA to trigger an avalanche of frivolous suits clogging federal courts.’ ”).
158. See Colker, supra note 157, at 99-100 (explaining that, “contrary to popular media
accounts, defendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA employment
discrimination cases.... These results are worse than results found in comparable areas of the
law; only prisoner rights cases fare as poorly”).
159. See id. at 100 n.10.
160. See id. (“Employment discrimination cases, which are most analogous to the ADA
cases studied ... were found to have a success rate of 22%.”).
161. See Nielson & Nelson, supra note 145, at 668 (discussing that victims of discrimination
“are often reluctant to complain”).
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III. PROPOSED METHODS OF MITIGATING NASSAR
The preceding Part showed that Nassar strayed from previous
understandings of Title VII and that the effects of the decision
should therefore be mitigated. This Part examines what can be done
to address the problems with Nassar, especially as they relate to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Following an explanation of why
Nassar’s reasoning is especially invalid in the ADA context, this
Part presents two possible solutions to the Nassar’s failings.162
These solutions are presented in descending order of efficacy, but in
ascending order of possibility: (1) abrogate Nassar through new
legislation and (2) distinguish the case to minimize its applicability
to the ADA.
A. Abrogate Nassar Through New Legislation
Because the Nassar ruling is simply a restrictive interpretation
of a federal statute, Congress should pass abrogating legislation to
reverse it. Similarly, the EEOC could promulgate new regulations
that specifically address its interpretive failings as the Nassar Court
saw them.
1. New Civil Rights Laws Amendments
The most effective solution to the threat that Nassar poses for
civil rights enforcement is to amend Title VII and the Americans
with Disabilities Act—and other civil rights statutes as well—to
clarify that the “motivating factor” standard applies in retaliation
claims.
In the aftermath of Nassar, Congress should once again pass an
amendments act to restore Title VII to its intended effectiveness.163
162. This Note will not address the argument that Nassar should simply be overturned
because it is exceedingly unlikely that such will occur. Statistically, the Court very seldom
directly overturns itself; this has happened only a handful of times in the history of the Court.
See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS 224-44 tbl. 2-17 (5th ed. 2012).
163. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2547 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Today’s misguided judgment ... should prompt yet another Civil Rights
Restoration Act.”); Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law:
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This could be accomplished as simply as modeling a new sub-section
in § 2000e-3 based on § 2000e-2(m). This subsection could read:
“Retaliation is established when the complaining party demon-
strates that discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting,
or participating in enforcement proceedings was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.” Although more elegant solutions exist,164
the transposition of previously considered and duly enacted
language from one section to another is least likely to require
expending substantial amounts of precious political capital.165
Congress has similarly amended the ADA in response to the
Supreme Court’s overly restrictive interpretations of the statute.166
In response to overly restrictive interpretations of the definition of
disability, Congress passed amendments to the ADA in 2008 to
reassert its intent and prevent the Court from further weakening
the ADA.167 As suggested above for Title VII, Congress could simply
add language to both the status-based antidiscrimination section
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 70-71 (2010) (“Congress might consider clarifying the applicability
of a contributing or ‘motivating’ factor causation standard to the various anti-retaliation
provisions in all federal employment statutes.”).
164. For example, restructuring the statute so that status-based discrimination and
retaliation are both in one section should remove any doubt that retaliation should be treated
the same as status-based discrimination. See Harper, supra note 163, at 70-71. But see
William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament’s Playbook and Fix
Employment Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 142-43 (2013) (criticizing
the “approach of simply fixing what it considers errant decisions” and proposing a
comprehensive reform law).
165. For a law to pass in Congress, the least controversial approach is necessary because
today’s Congress is the most polarized in history, and commentators point out that many in
Congress “show[ ] little interest in the plight of victims of job discrimination.” Jeffrey Toobin,
Will Ginsburg’s Ledbetter Play Work Twice?, NEW YORKER (June 25, 2013), http://www.
newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/06/ruth-bader-ginsburg-ledbetter-play.html
[http://perma.cc/4TW2-VPGL]; see also Dylan Matthews, It’s Official: The 112th Congress Was
the Most Polarized Ever, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Jan. 17, 2013, 11:07 AM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/17/its-official-the-112th-congress-was-the-
most-polarized-ever/ [http://perma.cc/5AWM-SETN].
166. See, e.g., ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)-(5), 122 Stat.
3553, 3554 (2012) (stating that the purpose of the Act was to reject the reasoning in several
Supreme Court cases).
167. Id.
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and the anti-retaliation section, stating that retaliation under the
ADA is to be proved by a “motivating factor” standard.168
Though passing an abrogating civil rights amendment act is the
most effective and straightforward means of minimizing Nassar’s
impact on both Title VII and the ADA, in the current political
climate, the reality of this proposed legislation passing is far from
certain.169 On the other hand, in response to another recent
Supreme Court decision about the Voting Rights Act,170 Congress
quickly responded by scheduling hearings and considering methods
of mitigating the impact of that decision.171 This could indicate the
willingness of Congress to come together in response to the Nassar
decision as well. It remains to be seen how, if at all, Congress will
respond to Nassar.
2. New Regulations
Nassar could also be addressed, in the ADA context at least, by
promulgating new EEOC regulations that define “motivating factor”
as the retaliation causation standard. This would be a practical fix
that would not require the direct involvement of the divided
Congress.172
Although the Court attacked the EEOC regulations, the Nassar
decision did leave some room for the possibility of regulatory
deference in the future, if different circumstances existed.173 The
Nassar Court ultimately rejected deference to the Title VII regula-
tions, citing a lack of persuasive force required under the Skidmore
deference standard, which requires administrative agencies to
show consideration, persuasiveness, validity, and consistency before
168. Incidentally, a well-drafted amendment could resolve the underlying circuit split on
the issue of which causation standard applies in ADA claims. See infra note 187.
169. See supra note 165.
170. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
171. See Alexei Koseff, Former Voting Rights Act Provision Gets Hearing in Senate, L.A.
TIMES (Jul. 17, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/17/nation/la-na-voting-rights-
20130718 [http://perma.cc/M4MU-ZCCX]; Justin Sink, House to Hold Hearing on Voting
Rights Act, THE HILL (Jul. 16, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/
news/311215-house-to-hold-first-voting-rights-act-hearing-after-supreme-court-ruling
[http://perma.cc/PMJ4-ZQDT].
172. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 801 (2012) (providing executive agencies the ability to promulgate
interpretive rules of statutes without Congressional approval).
173. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533-34 (2013).
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courts will defer to agency interpretations.174 However, if these
setbacks are addressed in EEOC regulations for Title I of the ADA,
deference should be given to the new regulatory interpretations.175
The Court faulted the EEOC Compliance Manual for Title VII for
concluding that “the causation element of a retaliation claim is
satisfied if ‘there is credible direct evidence that retaliation was a
motive for the challenged action,’ regardless of whether there is also
‘[e]vidence as to [a] legitimate motive.’”176 The Manual presents the
fact that there is a division of authority among the courts on this
issue, but concludes that “[c]ourts have long held that the eviden-
tiary framework for proving [status-based] discrimination ... also
applies to claims of discrimination based on retaliation.”177 The
Nassar Court faulted the EEOC Manual for presenting this
rationale without addressing “the particular interplay among the
status-based discrimination provision (§ 2000e-2(a)), the antire-
taliation provision (§ 2000e-3(a)), and the motivating-factor provi-
sion (§ 2000e-2(m)).”178 The Court found that this failure destroyed
the EEOC Manual’s credibility.179
The Court’s analysis left open, though, the possibility that the
EEOC could modify its regulations for the ADA to augment the
persuasive force of those explanations, thereby creating a stronger
argument for Skidmore deference in possible future litigation.180
Amending ADA regulations would likely be a less confusing task
174. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of [an agency]
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
175. See id.
176. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533-34 (citing 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(E)(1), at
614:0007-614:0008 (2003)).
177. 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(E)(1) (2003).
178. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533.
179. Id. If the EEOC addresses the Court’s concerns in the Title VII regulations, it is
possible that the Court will then find Skidmore deference is appropriate, but this Note focuses
on the more likely finding of Skidmore deference in the ADA Title I regulations.
180. The other elements of Skidmore, not expressly at issue here, are thoroughness,
validity, and consistency. 323 U.S. 140. Though the “validity of reasoning” element likely faces
a minor set back from the Nassar decision itself, the United States, through the Department
of Justice, has consistently argued that the “motivating factor” standard applies throughout
the ADA, which satisfies the consistency element. See, e.g., United States Brief as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Plantiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Jury Instructions at 3, Zamora-
Quezada v. HealthTexas Med. Grp. of San Antonio, 34 F. Supp. 2d 433 (1998) (No. SA-97-CA-
726-FB).
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than addressing the “unique statutory interplay” in the Title VII
regulations, which is complicated by the 1991 Amendments’
addition of the “motivating factor” standard to the antidiscrimina-
tion section, but not to the anti-retaliation section. The particular
“statutory interplay” in Title VII is not present in the ADA, as there
is no statutory imposition of a specific causation standard anywhere
in the ADA.181 Thus, the Skidmore element of consideration in the
ADA context is more easily met than in the Title VII context.
However, the EEOC would be remiss not to further bolster its case
for Skidmore persuasiveness in the new ADA regulations by citing
cases in the majority of circuits that apply the “motivating factor”
standard182 and by addressing the particular factors that make this
standard especially appropriate in ADA cases. A strong argument
could be made for Skidmore deference in the EEOC’s new regula-
tions for the ADA if the preceding suggestions are followed.
B. Distinguish Nassar from the ADA Because the ADA Is a              
   Fundamentally Different Law than Title VII
Though legislative or regulatory solutions are attractive, the most
practical way to effectively mitigate the impact of the Nassar de-
cision on the ADA is to tightly cabin its analysis to the specific facts
of the case, thereby narrowing the broadly worded holding.
Expansion of Nassar’s flawed Title VII analysis into ADA
jurisprudence is a rational concern from even a casual reading of the
Nassar opinion. In part, this concern derives from the similarities
between Title VII and the ADA. In fact, the ADA adopts Title VII’s
powers, remedies, and procedures as its own for Title I of the
ADA.183 The ADA is further similar to Title VII because it includes
discrete statutory language prohibiting retaliation: “No person shall
discriminate against any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter.”184
No definitive interpretation of this provision currently exists. The
accompanying regulations implementing this provision of the ADA
181. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-03, 12111-17, 12131-34,
12141-50, 12161-65, 12181-89, 12201-13 (2012).
182. See infra note 187.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
184. Id. § 12203.
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merely repeat the statutory language.185 The interpretive guidance
appendix to the regulations and the technical assistance manual
accompanying Title I similarly prove to be unhelpful.186
The courts, too, provide only limited guidance. The circuits are
split as to which standard applies to ADA retaliation claims, though
the majority of circuits appear to apply the “motivating factor”
standard.187 At least two courts have had the “opportunity to apply
Nassar to ADA retaliation claims,” and done so,188 or predicted that
a higher court will do so.189 This is cause for concern that Nassar’s
flawed reasoning will be categorically imported into the ADA’s
jurisprudence to address the lack of a definitive interpretation of the
ADA’s retaliation prohibition.190 This would be improper.
Even though the ADA and Title VII share several textual and
structural features, it is important to note that there are important
differences between the statutes. The source of disability discrimi-
nation is fundamentally different from race, color, religion, sex, and
185. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.12 (2013) (“It is unlawful to discriminate against any individual
because that individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this part or because
that individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing to enforce any provision contained in this part.”).
186. See generally Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2013).
187. The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits
follow the motivating factor standard, whereas the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits use the
“but for” test. See, e.g., Black v. City of Honolulu, 512 F. App’x 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2013); Cloe
v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 1180 (7th Cir. 2013); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition
Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012); Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261,
1278 (11th Cir. 2008); Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 2008); Griffith v.
City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004); Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc.,
318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003); Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 578
(2d Cir. 2003); Heiman v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 12 F. App’x 656, 664 (10th Cir. 2001);
Butler v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (M.D. La. 2012); Nuskey v. Hochberg,
730 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010); Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 37, 63 (D.
Me. 1996), aff ’d, 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997); Cromer v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 795,
801 (M.D.N.C. 1994), aff ’d, 65 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1995).
188. Doan v. San Ramon Valley Sch. Dist., No. C 13-03866 CRB, 2014 WL 296861, at *3
n.4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014).
189. Rubano v. Farrell Area Sch. Dist., 991 F. Supp. 2d 678, 705 (W.D. Pa. 2014).
190. See SUSAN GROVER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE
CASEBOOK 54 (2d ed. 2014) (“On questions of retaliation, the courts very often read the
statutes in pari material, meaning that precedent under one statute often guides courts in
their decisions under other statutes.”).
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national origin discrimination,191 which makes the “motivating
factor” standard particularly appropriate to ADA claims. In contrast
to race or sex, for example, people often create false classifications
for individuals with disabilities and then make negative assump-
tions about those individuals they arbitrarily and erroneously
classify.192 The actual limitations of people with disabilities are
mostly irrelevant in making these negative assumptions.193 Being
gainfully employed is one of the most effective methods for individu-
als with disabilities to overcome these stigmas.194 It would thus be
unjust to use the more stringent “but for” causation standard in
ADA cases, in which employers have, based on a false and socially
constructed stigma, used an employee’s disability status or opposi-
tion to instances of disability discrimination as the basis for
retaliation.
Not only is disability fundamentally different than the Title VII
statuses, disability is also simply more prone to retaliation that is
difficult to litigate.195 For example, in at least some cases, the
employer will retaliate without the affected employee recognizing
his employer’s actions as retaliation. This may occur if the employee
has an intellectual disability or is otherwise unable to perceive the
causal relationship between his disability and his adverse employ-
ment action. There is also the difficulty of defining “disability”196 or
“essential job functions” for which accommodations are not
191. See Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled, 74
GEO. L.J. 1435, 1436 (1986) (“[T]he problems of disadvantage in [the race, sex, age, and
disability] sectors are qualitatively different.”).
192. See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing
the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People With Disabilities, 40 UCLA
L. REV. 1341, 1357 (1993).
193. Id.
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2012) (addressing the fact that disability does not diminish
a person’s right to participate in society and that isolation and segregation of individuals with
disabilities is a serious and pervasive social problem); see also Drimmer, supra note 192, at
1349-50 (“According to many sociologists, the major problem faced by people with disabilities
is learning to conquer ... social stigma.”).
195. See Drimmer, supra note 192, at 1437-38. (contrasting the “brutal history of racism
in America” with the “complex” treatment of people with disabilities).
196. See id. at 1438-39 (“Unlike ... victims of sex discrimination, [people with disabilities]
do not constitute a coherent group.... [Also,] ‘handicapping’ conditions are, to a large extent,
relative and socially defined characteristics, not absolute criteria.”).
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required.197 With this difficulty and subjectivity comes the possible
trepidation of an employee with a disability failing to request an
accommodation because she fears that her employer will say that
the accommodation is unreasonable or that the job function is
essential, and then terminate her in retaliation for requesting an
accommodation.
Despite these important differences, federal courts have ignored
them in the past and simply imported a Title VII rule into the ADA,
with minimal analysis of its actual applicability.198 For example,
this occurred, to the detriment of ADA plaintiffs, in Eckles v.
Consolidated Rail Corporation, when the Seventh Circuit used Title
VII reasonable accommodation law relating to religious practices to
interpret the ADA’s reasonable accommodation for disabilities provi-
sion, notwithstanding the Eckles Court’s own recognition that
Congress had specifically instructed courts not to do this.199 The
Eckles Court thus “demonstrate[d] either a disregard for or igno-
rance of plainly expressed congressional intent.”200
In the aftermath of Nassar, there is a possibility that the Court
may repeat an Eckles-type error in the ADA retaliation context. In
fact, Nassar itself seemed to be doing something similar in Title VII
with its strange reliance on Gross, detailed above.201 Gross decided
that textual differences between the ADEA and Title VII counseled
against importing Title VII’s “motivating factor” standard into the
ADEA. However, the Nassar Court cited Gross to argue that textual
similarities between the ADEA and Title VII require the adoption
of the ADEA’s “but for” test for Title VII retaliation claims.
That the Court viewed the ADA and Title VII in the same light
is also suggested by the Nassar Court’s citation to the ADA as
justification for the disjointed method of statutory construction it
employed to interpret Title VII. Specifically, the Court wrote that:
“Further confirmation of the inapplicability of § 2000e-2(m) [to
§ 2000e-3] may be found in Congress’s approach to the [ADA] ...
[which] include[s] an express antiretaliation provision ... [that]
197. See Louis C. Rabaut, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Duty of Reasonable
Accommodation, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 721, 723 (1993) (“One of the most difficult tasks
under the ADA is the determination of essential job functions.”).
198. See Malloy, supra note 18, at 634 nn.147-49.
199. See Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996); id. at 635-36.
200. See Malloy, supra note 18, at 635.
201. See supra Part II.A.2.
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shows that when Congress elected to address retaliation as part of
a detailed statutory scheme, it did so in clear textual terms.”202
This citation to the ADA only proves the immediately apparent
fact that Title VII and the ADA both include discrete retaliation
sections. However, the citation implies that the Court will interpret
the ADA and Title VII interchangeably in the future, substantiating
the concern that ADA retaliation law is at risk of being subsumed
by Nassar’s erroneous “but for” standard. But again, the mere fact
that Congress addressed retaliation “in clear textual terms”203 in the
ADA, as in Title VII, demonstrates nothing more than Congress’s
expression of a particular disdain for employment retaliation based
on disability, not an expression of congressional intent to treat
retaliation differently than status-based discrimination.204
Therefore, the Nassar Court’s citation of the ADA as justification
for its textual analysis of Title VII should not be used in the future
to import the same logic into cases involving the ADA. The ADA is
a different law that protects different interests than Title VII and
should not be analyzed in the same way.205 Courts should distin-
guish future ADA retaliation cases from Nassar on this basis.
202. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2517, 2531 (2013).
203. Id.
204. This particular disdain was possibly grounded in the growing societal acceptance and
understanding of people with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2012).
205. See Malloy, supra note 18, at 635-36; see also Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552
U.S. 389, 393 (2008) (urging “employees and their counsel [to] be careful not to apply rules
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.”).
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IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Critics may argue that civil rights laws are already overly
plaintiff-friendly and that implementing the “motivating factor”
standard will increase the cost to society of civil rights litigation.206
These are improper angles from which to view this issue, and they
are also inaccurate. Civil rights litigation is not plaintiff-friendly. In
fact, the overwhelming majority of civil rights litigation results in
a loss for the plaintiff.207 In the ADA context, over 93 percent of
litigation results in a loss for the plaintiff.208 These statistics severe-
ly undermine the argument that employers must walk on eggshells
to avoid upsetting overly sensitive employees just to avoid exposure
to litigation.
Critics may also argue that “but for” causation is the most
popular standard for retaliation claims among all statutes, espe-
cially claims governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
scheme.209 The argument is that, because most courts use a “but for”
test, and because some courts have applied the “but for” test to the
ADA itself for status-based discrimination claims, all discrimination
claims across all statutes should be governed by the “but for” test.
This would, as the argument goes, vindicate the purposes of uni-
formity and prevent the flood of litigation that would occur under
the “motivating factor” standard. However, uniformity for the sake
of uniformity between civil rights laws is not necessarily a valid or
desirable goal, especially when considering the fact that disability
is fundamentally different than age or race or sex. This Note has
206. See, e.g., Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532.
207. See, e.g., EEOC 1997-2013, supra note 156; EEOC 1992-1996, supra note 156; Colker,
supra note 157, at 100 n.10 (“[P]laintiff success rate in civil rights actions for a seven-year
period (1978-1985) [were found] to range from voting rights cases (53%) to prisoner civil rights
cases (14%) .... Employment discrimination cases, which are most analogous to the ADA cases
studied ... were found to have a success rate of 22%.” (citing Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation
Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1578
(1989))).
208. Colker, supra note 157, at 100 (“[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three
percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial
court level.”).
209. Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63
MO. L. REV. 115, 148-49 (1998).
338 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:301
shown that, especially in ADA retaliation situations, the “but for”
standard unjustly limits employees’ rights and that the “flood of
litigation” argument has been soundly rejected by both academics
and judges.210 In light of these considerations, the “motivating
factor” test would be a valid standard to make consistent across
Title VII and the ADA. However, the clarity and consistency that
would result from such a standardization would promote the
interests of protecting employees’ rights and uphold the intent of
anti-discrimination legislation.
It is possible that the legislative remedies to Nassar that this
Note proposes are insufficient. Michael C. Harper, in his 2010
article proposing a response to Gross, advocated for a comprehensive
reconstruction of anti-discrimination legislation.211 But many would
view an overhaul of this magnitude as impracticable.212 This Note
takes a more practical approach. Although a comprehensive
overhaul would certainly be preferred, especially in the current
political climate, a small patch is simply more practical than an
entirely new statutory structure.213
Finally, a cynic may point to the “solely by reason of” language in
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973214 to undermine this
Note’s theme that disability discrimination claims should never be
analyzed as starkly as Title VII retaliation claims post-Nassar.
Since Congress previously enacted strict “but for” causation stand-
ards in the disability discrimination context, so the argument goes,
a “but for” standard in the ADA would not be unprecedented or
unacceptable. This point is easily dismissed. The Rehabilitation Act
was amended in 1992, to parallel the recently enacted ADA.215 Al-
though Congress did not remove the “solely by reason of” language,
210. See supra Part II.B.2.
211. Harper, supra note 163, at 70-71.
212. See Toobin, supra note 165 (pointing out that current political realities likely rule out
even a small patch, much less a comprehensive overhaul).
213. See Corbett, supra note 164, at 136-37.
214. “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of his
disability ... be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance.” Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
215. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344; see S.
Rep. No. 102-357, at 2, 7 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712, 3713, 3718 (stating that
one purpose of the 1992 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act was “to ensure that the
precepts and values embedded in the Americans with Disabilities Act are reflected in the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973”).
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this phrase was expressly superseded for employment claims: “The
standards used to determine whether this section has been violated
in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this
section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990.216 As explained above, that standard
is the “motivating factor” standard in the majority of the Circuits.217
Thus, at least for claims of employment discrimination, the
Rehabilitation Act’s “solely by reason” language poses no obstacle
for, and indeed supports the continued use of, the “motivating
factor” standard in ADA cases.218
In sum, the ADA protects different interests than Title VII, and
even though the ADA is purportedly based on Title VII, Title VII
jurisprudence should not be analogized to the ADA without thought-
ful consideration.
CONCLUSION
Though critics of employee protection laws believe that retaliation
should be more difficult to prove than asserted in this Note, this
sentiment leads to decisions like Nassar. The Court in Nassar either
misread or ignored the plain intent of Title VII by holding retalia-
tion to a different, more stringent standard than status-based
discrimination. The Nassar Court also failed to fully appreciate
significant public policy concerns and the potential collateral impact
the decision may have on other civil rights statutes, especially the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
There are several ways to mitigate the impact of the Nassar
decision. First, Congress should consider an amendments act to
clarify that the “motivating factor” standard, which was statutorily
216. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2012).
217. See supra note 187.
218. It goes without saying that discrimination and retaliation do not occur only in the
employment setting. Though beyond the scope of this Note, others have explained why
Congress did not remove the “solely by reason of” language as it applies to instances of
disability discrimination unrelated to employment. Lauren R. S. Mendonsa, Dualing
Causation and the Rights of Employees with HIV Under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 13
SCHOLAR 273, 310 (2010) (“Causation is generally not central to claims against providers of
public services and accommodations, such as hospitals, grocery stores, and schools, for failing
to accommodate people with disabilities, or, if it is, a stricter causation standard is less likely
to impact defendant liability.”). As Ms. Mendonsa suggests, however, causation generally is
central to claims against employers, as evidenced by Nassar itself. Cf. id.
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imposed on status-based discrimination claims, also applies to
retaliation claims. Similarly, the EEOC should consider promulgat-
ing new regulations regardring Title I of the ADA. The Court left
room in its analysis for the possibility of regulatory deference if the
regulations fit more strictly within the Skidmore rules. Finally,
lower courts should distinguish Nassar to minimize its effect on the
ADA. This third solution is not ideal, as it leaves the Nassar
decision intact, to be possibly used against deserving plaintiffs. But
it is likely the fastest and most achievable method of mitigating
Nassar’s impact, which is necessary if the ADA is to maintain its
integrity and efficacy in protecting the civil rights of individuals
with disabilities. By adopting this Note’s proposals, courts and
Congress would promote the principles of clarity, consistency, and
justice in both Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
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